JS3 unstabilised approach — wind overestimated, no glide-path recovery attempted

A Jonker JS3 overran the runway at La Motte-du-Caire (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence); the pilot was uninjured and the glider heavily damaged. The pilot overestimated the wind (forecast 30 km/h NNW with possible rotors; actual: weak valley breeze, no rotors) and deliberately flew high. On base the glider gained ~30 m; full airbrakes and flaps could not restore the path, and the recommended dive-out manoeuvre to regain the glide path was not attempted. After an aborted 180° turnback he diverted to the emergency parking, then a field beyond, striking vegetation. BEA cited the high unstabilised approach without a glide-path recovery attempt.

1. Return from local flight: After about 3 h 30 of local soaring, the pilot returned to the La Motte-du-Caire vélisurface and configured the JS3 for landing on the uphill north-facing runway (gear and flaps extended).
2. Intentionally high approach: BEA-cited contributing factor. The pilot estimated 30 km/h NNW surface wind with possible rotors over the first half of the runway (a Mistral-pattern concern) and deliberately flew a high approach path. Actual conditions per Météo-France were a weak north valley breeze (11 km/h surface, gusts to 37 km/h, 28 km/h at 150 m AGL), no rotors, no convergence/sink within 4 km of the airfield.
3. Wind information not cross-checked: The pilot did not request weather information from the frequency, although he had done so in the past. A club instructor flying with him on a Duo Discus one week earlier had reminded him not to fly below the hill that serves as altitude reference, in case of potential sink.
4. Limited recent local experience: 10 years visiting La Motte-du-Caire each summer, but only 6 flights here in 2023 + 3 in 2024 on the JS3, of which only 2 with north-facing landings.
5. Base-leg altitude gain: BEA-cited contributing factor. On entering base leg the indicated airspeed increased from 120 to 155 km/h and the glider gained roughly 30 m of altitude. BEA: possibly due to thermals, possibly to pilot inputs to reduce speed, or a combination of both.
6. Full drag deployed: Recognising he was too high and too fast, the pilot fully extended airbrakes and flaps to position L (+20°), continuing the approach over the runway. Observed L/D over the runway segment was ~6, consistent with the JS3 flight manual figures for full airbrakes.
7. Aborted 180°, late diversion: At one-third of the runway, still 75 m high, the pilot offset left intending a 180° right turn for an opposite-direction landing; abandoned this plan and rejoined the runway axis aiming for the published emergency parking. At 230 m runway remaining + 40 m high, judged this insufficient and chose to overrun into the field beyond.
8. Glide-path recovery not anticipated: BEA-cited contributing factor ("manque d'anticipation concernant la stratégie"). The 'rattrapage de plan' is the published last-resort recovery for an over-high final: with full airbrakes, take a sharp nose-down attitude until below nominal path (sacrificing optimum approach speed), then rejoin the path and reduce to VOA. It requires 600 m before the touchdown point, prior instructor training, and on the JS3's high wing loading must be anticipated. The pilot did not consider it. BEA safety lesson: shedding excess speed alone is necessary but not sufficient to stabilise an approach.
9. Vegetation strike, ground impact: Still airborne when crossing from the emergency parking toward the field beyond, the JS3 struck vegetation (bushes between the two areas) and impacted the ground about 40 m further. Glider heavily damaged; pilot uninjured.